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Abstract 
Various factors influence the commitment strength of a hegemonic member 
state to an international governmental organization. The research in this thesis 
employs a foreign policy analysis based framework in order to analyze what 
affects commitment strength. This is done by using findings from role theory 
that a shift along the ego-alter dimension of a role set leads to variance in 
commitment strength. However, these findings from role theory have never 
been applied to hegemonic behavior within international governmental 
organizations in particular. Therefore, this is researched by means of a 
qualitative comparative case study, comparing the cases of Russia and China in 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In this study, it is argued that Russia’s 
shift from an alter- to an ego-based role set, led to an increase in commitment 
strength, whereas China’s constant commitment strength was due to its 
continuous balanced ego-alter-based role set. 
 
Introduction 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a rather unique organization. This relatively 
young organization is a follow-up of the border issue settlements under the Shanghai Treaty 
between the “Shanghai Five”: China1, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union. In 2001 Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five and the group 
became an actual formal international organization, the SCO (Fredholm, 2013, p. 3). The 
SCO, which started out mainly as a security forum, has since then expanded its activities to 
various other areas such as economic cooperation, energy cooperation and even cultural 
exchange in a process described as “functionalism upside down” (Karns & Mingst, 2010, p. 
203). What makes this organization so unique and even puzzling, is the observation that 
although it is small organization with only six member states, it somehow managed to survive 
and develop, even though two out of the six member states are competing hegemons.  
A great deal of international relations (IR) theories deal with the acts of hegemons. 
Especially when viewed from their Cold War roots both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism deal 
largely with hegemonic acts. However, instead of looking for system level explanations, it is 
also possible to view the acts of hegemons from a perspective from within the national state 
itself, as foreign policy analysis (FPA) aims to do. When it comes to explaining the behavior 
                                                          
1
 “China” in this thesis refers to the People’s Republic of China, not to the Republic of China which is not an 
SCO member state. 
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of hegemons, both approaches have their merits. Therefore it would be a nice opportunity if 
these approaches could be combined to enhance themselves, as an explanation for the 
functioning of a multi-hegemonic organization may be found in both FPA and IR. One of the 
possible bridges between the IR approaches and the FPA approaches is found in role theory 
(Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, p. 19). Actors in international politics are known to act according to 
a certain “role” (Holsti, 1970). However, “role” is a large and complicated multi-layered 
construct affecting many aspects. One of these aspects is “commitment” (Holsti, 1970, p. 245). 
In order to get a better understanding of the functioning of a multi-hegemonic 
organization, this study will research the aspect of hegemonic member state commitment to 
an international governmental organization (IGO). The SCO, with its two competing 
hegemons, provides a unique opportunity to research the sources of hegemonic commitment 
to IGOs. Researching this puzzling functioning using role theory, leads to the following 
research question: how do roles affect the strength of hegemonic commitment to an 
international governmental organization?  
 This study seeks to answer this question by employing Harnisch’s model on “role 
learning” (2010) to the SCO case. Harnisch argues that a shift from an ego- to an alter-based 
identity, or vice versa, can lead to new roles as played by states. In this thesis a similar model 
is used on the more specific “commitment strength” variable.  
This thesis is structured as follows. First the literature on role theory, role learning and 
hegemons is discussed. After which the theoretical framework is laid out by explaining the 
model and conceptualizing the variables. The research method section describes how the 
qualitative comparative case study, to research whether an ego-alter-based identity shift is 
responsible for the changing commitment strength, is performed. In the conclusion section, 
the research findings are discussed, followed by an overview of this study’s implications and 
an evaluation of this work.  
  
Literature Review  
How do roles affect the strength of hegemonic commitment to an IGO? In order to answer 
this question an explanation is sought in role theory, as role theorists have used 
“commitment”, albeit in various forms, as an indicator for foreign policy roles (Harnisch, 
2010, p. 13; Holsti, 1970, p. 245; Wish, 1980, p. 543). Furthermore, role theory is discussed 
to reach an understanding of its function as tool to explain foreign policy behavior.  
Role theory, although a much older concept, is largely associated with the “seminal” 
work (Thies & Breuning, 2012, p. 2) by Holsti (1970). Holsti found that a lot of state actions 
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can be explained by certain role conceptions the state has. These role conceptions cannot 
simply be used in the analysis, as they consist mostly of system level IR based explanations, 
while this study focusses on FPA, which seeks state level explanations. Nonetheless Holsti’s 
findings do provide insights into state role behavior. Although Holsti did not find a “perfect 
fit” between national role conceptions and foreign policy actions, national role conceptions 
still remain a useful tool to understand foreign policy action, as most actions are “reasonably 
consistent with role conceptions” (Holsti, 1970, pp. 304-306). Because of this reasonable 
consistency with role conceptions, Holsti argued that FPA’s task “should be to explain the 
origins, presence, and sources of change of national role conceptions rather than single 
decisions” (1970, p. 306).  
Walker expanded on these findings, by distinguishing between foreign policy that is 
coherent with role conceptions and foreign policy that is not (1979, p. 204). Walker explains 
this “congruence” or “incongruence” between roles and policy by using the concepts of “role 
strain” and “role conflict”, in which role strain indicates the difficulty to fulfill role 
expectations, while role conflict indicates multiple sources of role strain that contradict each 
other (Walker, 1979, pp. 188-189).  
Such strains and conflicts on roles form a basis for the changing of roles (Harnisch, 
2010, p. 5). Harnisch, who suggests a dialogue between “role learning” and “foreign policy 
learning” (2010, p. 7), also focusses on role strain and conflict. In order to explain how roles 
become strained or conflicted, Harnisch employs classic sociological concepts from the works 
of George H. Mead (Harnisch, 2010, pp. 8-11). For his model Harnisch uses the interactionist 
concepts from Mead. Using this model he describes three dimensions of variance leading to 
role learning. Only one of these dimensions is useful in FPA, as this dimension provides a 
state level explanation for “role taking” or “role making”. With “role taking” an actor takes on 
previously existing role and with “role making” an actor (re)constructs a new role for itself 
(Harnisch, 2010, pp. 3-4). Such practice of role “taking” and “making” generates role sets. 
There are two bases for role sets. Role sets can on the one hand be formed in order to 
confirm to the expectations or the perceived expectations of others, such a role set would then 
confirm to an alter-based identity. On the other hand, role sets can be formed by the actor’s 
own preferences and requirements, such a role set would then confirm to an ego-based 
identity. While not the main focus of his research, it should be noted that Holsti uses a similar 
distinction by acknowledging a difference between an alter-based “role prescription” and an 
ego-based “role conception” (1970, pp. 239-240).  What is interesting about this distinction is 
its linkage to commitment. Harnisch describes shifts along the “ego-alter dimension” as 
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leading to variance along the “commitment spectrum” (2010, pp. 13-14).  This process forms 
the basis for the model of this study and is further expanded on in the theoretical framework 
section. However some “weaknesses” in Harnisch’s model (2010) should be noted. The first 
gap in Harnisch’s model is its lack of direction. Harnisch only speaks of shifts along the ego-
alter dimension leading to variance along the commitment spectrum, not about the direction 
of this variance. The second gap in Harnisch’s model is that it only addresses shifts and 
variance, but does not address the effects of stability along the ego-alter dimension on the 
commitment spectrum. 
As this study deals with hegemonic actions, an understanding of the options a 
hegemon has is required. Although he deals more with a system level of analysis, Cronin’s 
(2001) research addresses both hegemons and role strain. Cronin’s findings on role strain thus 
provide useful insights. According to Cronin, a hegemon’s role is strained because it has to 
balance between two different and sometimes incompatible role conceptions, the role of a 
systemic leader and the role of a great power (2001, pp. 104-105). As a leader, the hegemon 
aims to shape the international or regional order, rules, procedures and institutions. However, 
being a part of such institutions itself places a limit on the role in which the hegemon can act 
unilaterally and in its own national interests. This role strain between acting responsibly 
international, or acting in its own parochial interests is described by Cronin as the “Paradox of 
Hegemony” (2001, p. 105).  
The remaining literature concerning role conceptions is based upon the selection of the 
roles themselves. The classic answer to the question of role selection is provided by the work 
of Wish (1980). Whish found out, by examining role conception based on three identifying 
variables: “status”, “motivational orientation” and “substantive problem areas” (1980, pp. 
536-540), that most national role conceptions can be explained by two categories: 
“cooperative versus competitive” roles and “high status versus low status” roles (1980, p. 
549). Wish’s role conceptions cannot simply be used in order to find an FPA based 
explanation for the roles played and the commitment strength exhibited by hegemons. This is 
because cooperative and competitive roles are systemic roles and Wish did not examine the 
national factors influencing role choices.  
FPA scholars however, do examine these national factors. Cantir & Kaarbo (2012), for 
example, argue that role conceptions themselves are inherently contested, but not just by 
simple external role strain and role conflict. There is also contestation within the state itself, 
as roles can be vertically contested by disagreement between the elites and the masses (Cantir 
& Kaarbo, 2012, pp. 11-12), or horizontally contested by disagreement among the elites 
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themselves, for example between the governing parties and the opposition (Cantir & Kaarbo, 
2012, p. 12). Such findings have led others, such as Brummer & Thies (2015) to (partially) 
dismiss the “black box” approach to role theory, in which the state is viewed as a black box 
out of which a single role springs. Brummer and Thies therefore focus on the domestic 
politics shaping the roles of a state (2015, p. 276). Although this approach certainly has its 
merits, it is beyond the reach of this study. This thesis is concerned with an IGO whose 
membership consists of authoritarian states, making the measurements of opposition attitudes 
and public opinions a difficult or even dubious affair. Therefore, the role sets of the 
hegemonic states will be based on a more black-box like model. 
 To summarize, state behavior can be explained by identifying the roles that states play 
(Holsti, 1970). These roles are linked to various different aspects. One such aspect is 
commitment. Variance along the ego-alter dimension of a state’s role sets leads to variance 
along the commitment spectrum (Harnisch, 2010). Note that although Harnisch’s model 
seems to lack a direction to the variance along the commitment spectrum, the cases he 
examines in fact do show a direction. Using the direction shown in Harnisch’s case studies 
(2010), the following hypotheses are defined: 
 
H1: The more a hegemonic state switches from an alter- to an ego-based role set, the more 
the strength of commitment to an international governmental organization decreases. 
H2: The more a hegemonic state switches from an ego- to an alter-based role set, the more 
the strength of commitment to an international governmental organization increases. 
 
A third hypothesis is included due to the second gap in Harnisch’s model (2010), concerning 
the effects of stability along the ego-alter dimension on commitment spectrum variance:  
 
H3: If a hegemonic state has a stable ego- or alter-based role set, the strength of commitment 
to an international governmental organization remains stable as well. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The model 
The model used in this study proposes that shifts along the ego-alter dimension of a 
hegemon’s role set lead to variance in commitment strength towards an IGO. This model 
expands on Harnisch’s research (2010) which shows that a shift along the dimensions that 
make up a role set, lead to variance along the “commitment spectrum” (Harnisch, 2010, pp. 
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13-14). The role set dimension applicable to this thesis, is the ego-alter dimension, as it gives 
a state level explanation suited for an FPA study. Using this model, this study aims to identify 
whether a shift from a hegemon’s ego- to an alter-based role set or vice versa, will lead to 
variance along the commitment spectrum towards an IGO. Concerning the operationalization 
of “variance along the commitment spectrum”; commitment is operationalized as “strength of 
commitment” and variance is operationalized as an increase or decrease of commitment 
strength, leading to non-variance being operationalized as stability in commitment strength. 
 
Conceptualizing commitment strength 
In order to research this model, commitment strength serves as the dependent variable, 
whereas the ego- or alter-based role sets serve as the independent variables. Therefore the 
concept of commitment strength will have to be defined. Although various definitions for 
“commitment” exist, the definitions used in FPA and comparative foreign policy in particular 
are most applicable to this study, as it compares hegemonic state behavior in an IGO. Patrick 
Callahan in this tradition defines “commitment” as follows: “Commitment is the creation 
through foreign policy behavior of constraints on the actor’s future behavior, provided that the 
constraints can be reasonably anticipated to be consequences of the action.” (1982, p. 182). P. 
Callahan also gives a definition for commitment strength, or “intensity” as he calls it: 
“Intensity of commitment in an action is the extent of constraint on the actor’s future behavior 
produced by the current behavior.” (P. Callahan, 1982, p. 182). These definitions show that 
commitment is multi-faceted construct.  
In order to conceptualize commitment, the facets which make up commitment will 
have to be identified. For this P. Callahan points to the Comparative Research on the Events 
of Nations (CREON) project, in which he participated himself. This project was one of the 
largest and most famous projects in the history of comparative foreign policy. In order to 
measure commitment, the CREON project employed a commitment scale. This scale ranks 
events according to four different classes of commitment. The first class is “significant 
nonverbal behaviors”, such behavior is operationalized as “allocation of resources” (P. 
Callahan, 1982, pp. 188-190). When a state allocates resources to a project or institution it 
shows commitment to this project or institution.  
The second class is “pledging behavior”, when a state pledges its support, or even its 
participation in future actions, it shows a degree of commitment (P. Callahan, 1982, pp. 188-
190). This indicator specifically includes pledges made during (formal) agreements as they 
indicate that “some formal commitment has been made” (P. Callahan, 1982, p. 190). It should 
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be noted however, that a difference exists between verbal and actual commitment. An actor 
may declare that it will share its resources, indicating a strong commitment, but when in 
reality it neglects to share its resources, it exhibits behavior indicating a weaker commitment. 
Actual nonverbal behavior can thus trump pledging behavior when these two contradict one 
another.  
The third class is: “implicit indicators of intentions”. These indicators consist of 
evaluations, general statements of policy and symbolic or insignificant nonverbal behavior (P. 
Callahan, 1982, pp. 189-191).  
The final class is formed by a lack of these all commitment indicators and therefore 
indicates “no commitment” (P. Callahan, 1982, p. 189). It should be noted that all these 
classes form a scale. On this scale, actual resource allocating commitments from the first class 
indicate a higher strength of commitment, then a mere symbolic gesture from the third class 
of commitment. The classes of this commitment scale from the CREON project will therefore 
serve to conceptualize commitment strength as the dependent variable for this thesis.  
 
Conceptualizing role sets bases 
The ego- or alter-based role sets serve as the independent variables in this thesis. In order to 
understand the basis for a role set, one first has to grasp the concept of a “role set”. This 
concept is associated with the work of sociologist Robert K. Merton. He defines role sets as a: 
“complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a 
particular social status” (1957, p. 110). This means that a role set is the array of roles 
associated with a particular social status. While Merton’s conceptualization deals with 
persons, the same definition applies to states as well. As a state’s role set is the array of roles 
played by a state in a particular social status, such as, membership of an IGO, a hegemony, or 
trade partnership. For this study it is not necessary to define the role sets in detail, as this 
study is only concerned with the basis of the role sets. Namely, whether they are ego- or alter-
based.  
In order to understand the basis for a state’s role set, it is important to understand that 
role conceptions are connected to a state’s “identity, its priorities and policies, and how it 
relates to other states” (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, p. 19). This is further illustrated by Hudson, 
while discussing the effects of culture and national identity on foreign policy, further 
illustrates this by describing role conceptions as: “a vision of the nation’s role in world affairs 
that corresponds to deep cultural beliefs about the nation” (2013, p. 130). Therefore, in order 
to define the basis of the role sets, the cultural/identity base for the foreign policy role sets of 
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the cases are described in the analysis, with particular attention as to whether they are ego- or 
alter-based. 
 
Conceptualizing hegemony 
The final concept of the model to be defined is hegemony. Hegemony is a large and 
multifaceted construct as well (Destradi, 2010, p. 912). In order to make this concept 
manageable, this study employs the rather basic definition of hegemony by Heywood: “the 
leadership or domination of one element of a system over others” (2014, p. 228). This 
definition is useful in the operationalization of the research question. As the “system” is the 
IGO in question and the “dominant element(s)”, are one or more member state(s) of this 
organization. 
 
Research Method 
Methodology 
In order to answer the research question, how roles affect the strength of hegemonic 
commitment to an IGO, a comparative qualitative case study is undertaken. Due to the very 
nature of the SCO as a consensus based organization (Yu, 2013, p. 38) with authoritarian 
member states, it can be difficult to quantify the variables concerning the individual member 
states’ commitment strength within the scope of this study. Therefore, a qualitative case study 
based analysis is undertaken, as case studies have advantages in the “operationalization and 
measurement of qualitative variables” (Bennett, 2004, p. 34). During this qualitative case 
study, for each case the independent variables are defined, after which the qualitative 
empirical analysis is undertaken to measure the dependent variables.  
 
Case selection 
In order to increase validity, two different cases will be compared. As the SCO is an 
organization driven and founded by two hegemons, a comparative case study is the logical 
method of research, as that way a comparison can be made between the actions of two 
different hegemons in the same structure. Furthermore, global factors are limited due to the 
regional characteristic of the organization. Because of the major differences in power between 
the two hegemons and the other four member states, it is possible two analyze SCO behavior 
as being the product of both hegemons. This makes the SCO an ideal organization to study the 
policies and roles of hegemonic member states.  
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The two hegemonic cases to be compared are China and Russia, as both states fit 
Heywood’s definition of a hegemon as a “dominant element”. The table below indicates the 
dominance of China and Russia vis-à-vis the other four member states in; population (World 
Bank, 2017c), GDP (World Bank, 2017a) and military expenditures (World Bank, 2017b), in 
2015. These large differences and others facts, such as that only China and Russia are nuclear 
powers, illustrate the hegemonic positions both China and Russia inhabit within the SCO.  
 
Operationalization 
The ego- or alter-based role sets used by both hegemonic member states serve as the 
independent variables. The cultural/identity bases of these role sets have already been defined 
and extensively researched by Tsygankov (2016) in the Russian case and Shi & Yin (2013) in 
the Chinese case. Their theories will therefore serve to define the role set bases and thereby 
the independent variables in the empirical analysis.  
“Commitment strength” serves as the dependent variable. This variable is measured by 
categorizing the behavior of both hegemonic states into each of the four classes from the 
CREON project’s commitment scale, as listed in the theoretical framework: “significant 
nonverbal behaviors”, “pledging behaviors”, “implicit indicators of intentions” and “no 
commitment”. Commitment strength is measured by these four indicators. Furthermore, a 
distinction between mere verbal and actual commitment is made, in which mere verbal 
commitment indicates a weaker form of commitment then actual practical commitment. 
Lastly, it should be noted that only multilateral cooperation can be used as an indicator of 
strong commitment to an IGO, whereas bilateral cooperation which circumvents the IGO 
cannot. As bilateral cooperation may indicate commitment to another actor, it says little about 
commitment strength to the IGO itself. 
                                                          
2
 2014 data, but useful nonetheless in illustrating the gap in expenditure with Russia and China.  
3
 2003 data, see footnote 
2
. 
SCO member state Population 
(thousands) 
GDP 
(millions US$) 
Military expenditure 
(percentage of GDP) 
China 1,371,220.00 11,064,664.79 1.9% 
Russia 144,096.87 1,331,207.75 5% 
Kazakhstan 17,544.13 184,388.43 1% 
Kyrgyzstan  5,956.90 6,571.85 3.6% 
Tajikistan 8,481.85 7,853.45 1.1%
2
 
Uzbekistan 31,298.90 66,732.74 0.5%
3
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The comparison between both cases is made by comparing each hegemon’s indicator 
within the timeframe of its first ego-alter-based role set, to the same indicator within the 
timeframe of its new ego-alter-based role set, if a shift in role set bases has occurred. If such a 
shift in role sets bases has not occurred, the indicators are compared by splitting SCO history 
in half, in which a comparison is made between the same indicators in the first half to those in 
the second half of SCO history, to see whether a change in commitment strength has occurred. 
 
Data selection 
Due to the relatively short history of the SCO it is possible to compare data over the entire 
SCO history. This helps to make the analysis as comprehensive as possible. It should be noted 
that both hegemons are authoritarian states, listed as “not free” by Freedom House 
(Puddington & Roylance, 2017, pp. 21-23). This makes the lack of transparency in their 
decision making an obvious source of bias. In order to deal with this bias, the analysis relies 
mostly on secondary literature. In order to increase the reliability of this literature, almost 
every publication used is peer reviewed. In order to deal with cultural or nationalist biases and 
to gain thorough understanding of both states’ actions, publications from both Russian and 
Chinese scholars, as well as various other Asian and Western scholars, are examined. This 
secondary data is complemented by official SCO publications, as the SCO has published 93 
documents on its website dating from 2001 to the present date. These documents consist of, 
amongst other things, joint communiques, summit press releases, agreements etcetera. Due to 
the consensus based nature of SCO decision making, it is safe to assume that whatever is 
written in these documents enjoys the backing of both hegemons. Furthermore, on rare 
occasions the individual input of either state is explicitly mentioned. This makes the 
documents a vital source in identifying hegemonic commitment strength. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
The Russian case: independent variable 
In contrast to the present rise of China, Russia in recent history had to deal with decline. From 
being a superpower in a bipolar world as the leader of the Soviet Union, to the new Russian 
Federation, after the Cold War Russia was greatly reduced in both size and power and had to 
deal with a new multipolar world (Donaldson & Nogee, 1998, pp. 286; 288-289). In this new 
multipolar world order Russia had to redefine its interests as it could no longer simply 
“balance” the USA. 
11 
 
Tsygankov (2016) argues that there are three distinct (historical) schools of thought 
within Russian foreign policy making. The table below describes their general policies 
(Tsygankov, 2016, pp. 5-8). 
 
Russia’s elites have switched between these schools in order to form their foreign policies and 
with that the role set they work with. This switching is illustrated by Turner:  
 
Compared to China, Russia’s “identity crisis” in the post-cold war era was more severe 
and took the form of an acute (and prolonged) case of schizophrenia, with its foreign 
policy oscillating between allying with the West and allying with the East (2009, p. 162). 
 
In practice this switching between foreign policy schools is identified by Tsygankov as 
follows: during Putin’s first term as president (2000-2004), Russia balanced between the 
schools of Westernizer and Statist with his policy of “pragmatic cooperation”, in order to 
preserve Russia’s status as a great power (2016, pp. 9; 263). During Putin’s second term 
(2004-2008), when faced with a higher degree of US unilateralism, Russia’s foreign policy 
became more assertive (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 264). During the Medvedev presidency (2008-
2012), Russia sought “alliances for modernization”. This changed during the second decade 
of the 21
st
 century and especially during Putin’s third term as president (2012-present), when 
Russia started acting in a more Civilizationist way, responding to the increased competition 
between the West and the Non-West (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 265). 
Russia’s role set during the first decade of the 21st century, can therefore be described 
as being alter-based, as Russia chose to cooperate pragmatically with the West, the alter. 
Although Russia, during Putin’s second term as president, started acting somewhat more 
assertive, during the Medvedev period Russia started to re-approach the alter, in response to 
the 2008 global crisis (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 233). However, during the second decade of the 
21
st
 century, the shift to the Civilizationist school marked a shift to a more ego-based role set. 
Russia’s less cooperative stance marked an end to the reapproachment to the alter. Instead 
School Policy 
Westernizer Approach the West and its values and norms. 
Statist Recognition from the West and co-existence. Preserve status quo. 
Civilizationist 
 
Russian Values distinct from Western values. Spread Russian values outside of 
Russia. 
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Russia started acting based on its own identity and civilizational ideal. Such a role set could 
be described as being more ego-based. This shift to a more ego-based policy is illustrated by 
Putin himself in 2014:  
 
[P]rimitive borrowing and attempts to civilize Russia from abroad were not accepted by 
an absolute majority of our people. This is because the desire for independence and 
sovereignty in spiritual, ideological and foreign policy spheres is an integral part of our 
national character (as cited in Tsygankov, 2016, p. 233). 
 
From a more psychological perspective, Larson & Sevchenko come similar 
conclusions about the more assertive Russia, by pointing out the fact that Russian elites 
nowadays fear to suffer humiliation and loss of status, and therefore take a more opposing 
stance vis-à-vis the West (2014, p. 277). The conflict concerning Russia and Ukraine has also 
been explained as Russia trying to regain “its own” (ego-based) identity conception of a 
“great power” (Marten, 2015, p. 195). All this points to a shift in Russian foreign policy, from 
an alter-based role set in the first decade of the 21
st
 century, to an ego-based role set in the 
second decade. The comparison of the dependent variable indicators is therefore made 
between the first decade of the 21
st
 century, in which Russia used a more alter-based role set 
and the second decade of the 21
st
 century, in which Russia used a more ego-based role set. 
 
The Russian case: dependent variable 
Concerning the first indicator, Russia has exhibited “significant nonverbal behavior”, 
however most of this behavior occurred during the second decade of the 21
st
 century. During 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century, when Russia employed an alter-based role set, not many 
cases of actual resource allocation to multilateral SCO projects by Russia can be found. The 
most major ones being the Russian participations in the SCO joint military exercises. 
However, this participating behavior by Russia does not really indicate a strong commitment 
as these resource allocations where of a limited scale. This is illustrated by the fact that Russia 
did not participate in the first military exercise between SCO member states in 2002 (Frost, 
2009, p. 98). Even further, Russia disavowed Chinese presence in Kyrgyzstan (Frost, 2009, p. 
98). Later, when Russia did choose to participate in the largest joint SCO wargames known as 
“Peace Missions”, the resource allocation remained limited. This is illustrated by the fact that 
during these “Peace Missions” Russia insisted on a reduction in their size, in order to block 
Chinese aspirations (Frost, 2009, p. 99). Furthermore, during Peace Mission 2007, Russian 
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generals have described the presence of the Chinese as: “a test of communication and 
information support of a potential enemy of China” (Wilhelmsen & Flikke, 2011, p. 885). 
Russia’s limited commitment to SCO military cooperation is further illustrated by the 
observation that Russia did favor military exercises in the region, however under the banner 
of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This is shown, amongst 
other things, by a Russian proposal that Peace Mission 2007 should be a joint CSTO-SCO 
effort (Frost, 2009, p. 99). 
 The Russian behavior fitting the “nonverbal commitment strength” indicator changed 
in the second decade of the 21
st
 century. When under Russia’s 2014-2015 chairmanship, as 
part of the Russian Chairmanship Activity Plan, one hundred joint SCO projects where started 
in various fields including “political, trade and economic, cultural and humanitarian” fields 
(Lukin, 2015, p. 40).  
Russian commitments fitting the “pledging behavior” indicator are best demonstrated 
in the economic cooperation sphere, where Russia seeks a “reliable economic partner” 
(Ambrosio, 2017, p. 138). How much Russia desires such a partner, is constrained however 
by Russia’s interest in limiting China’s influence in Central Asia (Oldberg, 2013, p. 141) and 
its wariness of becoming dependent on China (Oldberg, 2013, p. 148). Such limiting factors 
fit closely with Russia’s alter-based Statist school which favors peaceful co-existence with 
others, but maintains original spheres of influence as part of state integrity.  
In practice this influence limiting quality of Russian SCO economic policy, is 
illustrated by Putin’s proposal for an SCO Energy Club in 2006 (Movkebaeva, 2013, p. 81). 
While such a proposal at first seems to indicate a strong commitment, in reality this 
commitment is limited at best. The importance of energy collaboration can hardly be 
overstated. Russia is the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons, while China is the world’s 
largest consumer (Koolaee & Tishehyar, 2013, p. 50). Concerning the export of energy, 
Russia needs an alternative to Japan and the European Union (Ganguli, 2013, p. 282), while 
China needs energy in order to secure its continued economic growth (Ganguli, 2013, p. 280). 
Such a climate seems favorable to found an SCO energy club. However, apart from the 
establishment of a “working group” dealing with a possible SCO energy club (SCO, 2006, p. 
2), no other SCO document mentions an “Energy Club” thereafter. Furthermore although 
some progress on energy cooperation has been made, such progress has been mostly bilateral 
instead of multilateral. Like the Chinese/Russian gas-pipeline project’s “memorandum of 
understanding” from 2006 (Koolaee & Tishehyar, 2013, p. 50). This lack of progress has led 
various scholars to doubt the sincerity of the Russian Energy Club proposal. Chinese scholar 
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Weiqing Song described the proposal as being merely: “another Russian tactic to control 
Central Asian energy resources” (2014, p. 97). While Kazakh scholar Nargis Kassenova goes 
even further by stating that Russia’s goal was never to really establish an Energy Club, but 
merely to threaten the West (as cited in Ganguli, 2013, p. 288). These developments lead to 
the conclusion that although Russia pledged itself to an SCO Energy Club, showing a strong 
degree of commitment, the following actions indicated that this pledge was a mere verbal one 
indicating a much weaker commitment.  
The following decade shows a different picture when it comes to the “pledging 
behavior” indicator, as is shown by Russia’s willingness to compromise on the issue of SCO 
expansion. The expansion of SCO membership has always been a possibility, however due to 
conflicting interests it never actually happened. The two most likely candidates to join the 
SCO where India and Pakistan. Both states where granted the newly institutionalized SCO 
observer status (SCO, 2004) in 2005 (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 1327). However some researchers, 
such as Song, argued that actual membership would be unlikely in the “near future” (2014, p. 
100). This is because India is backed by Russia, while Pakistan is backed by China (Cabestan, 
2013, p. 426; Song, 2014, p. 100). Admitting either one of these states would require a 
compromise, as China does not agree to the admission of India alone (Song, 2014, p. 100). 
Nevertheless, such a compromise did occur in 2016, when both India and Pakistan signed a 
memorandum of obligation (SCO, 2016a, p. 2), as a necessary step leading to an expected full 
membership in 2017. Other cases of Russian newfound pledging behavior are found in 2014 
when Russia pledged its support to the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative
4
, as well as in 
2015 when Russia proposed to expand SCO cooperation to more fields such as tourism (SCO, 
2015b, p. 4). This proposal to expand SCO activities turned out to be more than a mere verbal 
gesture, because about half a year later a tourism development program was signed (SCO, 
2016b, p. 5). 
When it comes to the “implicit indicators of intentions” indicator of commitment 
strength, such as policy statements and evaluations, it is difficult to accurately assess whether 
Russian behavior in the first decade of the 21
st
 century differed from its behavior in the 
second decade. American scholar Elizabeth Wishnick does nonetheless notice a change in 
Russian participation in the SCO when she states that Russia has: “long stymied economic 
cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization … In 2015, however, Russia 
appeared more interested in multilateral cooperation involving China” (2015, p. 54)”. Putin 
                                                          
4
 Discussed in the Chinese section of the analysis. 
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himself in 2011 called to “push cooperation within the organization to the next level” and 
stated the SCO’s importance as “a new driving force for regional and world economic growth” 
(as cited in Wang, 2012, p. 95). However, this time it did not prove to be empty rhetoric by 
Putin. At the conclusion of Russia’s 2014-2015 SCO chairmanship, the SCO heads of state 
evaluated Russia’s chairmanship as follows: “The heads of state highly appreciated the level 
of organization and effectiveness of Russia's chairmanship in the SCO” (SCO, 2015c, p. 3). 
While a note of appreciation is standard when a SCO state concludes its yearly chairmanship, 
no other note was so elaborate in its phrasing and praised “the level of organization and 
effectiveness” of a chairmanship. Another change in the “implicit indicator of intentions” was 
evidenced in November 2011, when Russia hosted the SCO heads of government council 
meeting, where the SCO’s development strategy was discussed and Russia defined its new 
policies when it  “expressed its assumptions” via a series of “road maps” (Tulibayeva & 
Sadvokassova, 2013, p. 259).  
 The table below illustrates the findings of Russia’s committal behavior towards the 
SCO. Judging from these findings it becomes clear that Russia’s commitment strength to the 
SCO has increased for most indicators. The timeframe of this difference in commitment 
strength matches the different approximate timeframes of the alter- or ego-based role sets. 
 
The Chinese case: independent variable 
China’s foreign policy is the product of its rapid (economic) rise in world politics, in which it 
has become increasingly proactive (Ye & Zhang, 2013, p. 287). Due to this rise China had to 
“bargain” for a new role to play in world politics (He & Walker, 2015, pp. 371-372). Whether 
 1
st
 decade of the 21
st
 century (alter-
based role set) 
2
nd
 decade of the 21
st
 century 
(ego-based role set) 
Significant 
nonverbal behavior 
Military exercises (limited). SCO joint projects. 
Pledging behavior SCO Energy Club (verbal). Compromise on SCO expansion.  
SCO tourism program. 
Support for OBOR. 
Implicit indicators of 
intentions 
No examples found. Chairmanship praised by heads of 
state.  
Development strategy road maps. 
No commitment First SCO joint military exercise. No examples found. 
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this new role set is an ego- or an alter-based one, is a matter of debate. This debate is 
addressed by Chih-Yu Shih (2012), when he states that according to some views China is an 
“ego state”, whereas when viewed from another perspective, China is a “role state” 5. While 
Shih does not provide a clear answer as to which perspective best describes Chinese foreign 
policy, he does elaborate on the topic a year later in collaboration with Jiwu Yin (2013). With 
whom he describes the “harmonious realism” model of Chinese foreign policy.  
This model is a compromise between two foreign policy goals. The first goal is based 
on the historic philosophical worldview of tianxia or “all under heaven”. Without delving into 
much detail about its complicated philosophical meaning, it should be noted that this 
worldview resonates with the Chinese elites in order to build a non-Western, non-Westphalian 
based hegemonic order (W.A. Callahan, 2008, pp. 758-759). This worldview is expressed in 
Chinese president Hu Jintao’s famous “Harmonious World” rhetoric (W.A. Callahan, 2008, p. 
758). China’s other foreign policy goal is described by Nathan, when he argues that China’s 
foreign policy is not “irrational or aggressive” (2016, p. 180), but simply based on the “hard 
logic of geostrategic vulnerability” (Nathan & Scobell, as cited in Nathan, 2016, p. 758). 
According to Shih & Yin (2013) the most thorough understanding of China’s national 
role conception is achieved by combining both goals. Using the concept of role contestation, 
they argue that China’s role conception, hinges on two different goals, the creation of either a 
“Harmonious World” or the defense of core national interests. China has to make concessions, 
in order to create or maintain harmony, which can be incompatible with the defense of the 
core national interests (Shih & Yin, 2013, p. 73). Because of this dilemma, China has to 
compromise and play roles based on “harmonious realism”, which due to the fact of being a 
compromise, is neither fully interest based realism nor is it harmonious with all the parties 
involved (Shih & Yin, 2013, pp. 73-75; 84). Interesting is that this “harmonious realism” 
policy echoes Cronin’s “Paradox of Hegemony” (2011). 
Defining role sets in defense of core national interests can be seen as a form of ego-
based foreign policy, while making concessions to the alter in order to preserve harmony can 
be seen as “role state” behavior and therefore alter-based behavior (Shih & Yin, 2013, p. 74). 
Therefore, role sets based on “harmonious realism” tend to balance between ego- and alter-
based role sets. As the analysis in this study deals with changes along the ego-alter dimension, 
it should be noted that Shih & Yin find harmonious realism-congruent role behavior over a 
period longer then the SCO’s existence (Shih & Yin, 2013, pp. 75-76) and found it continuing 
                                                          
5
 Shih (2012) and Shih & Yin (2013) use the term “role state”, which is a form of state based on the alter, as this 
term implies the settling into a role as prescribed by the alter. 
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into the present. Due to this timeframe, it can be assumed that as China’s foreign policy role 
set is based on “harmonious realism” throughout the existence of the SCO, therefore China’s 
ego- and alter-based parts of the role set where relatively constant throughout SCO history. 
This role set continuity makes it impossible to compare the dependent variable indicators for 
different role set timeframes, as there are no different role sets over the course of SCO history. 
The comparison is therefore made between the first half of SCO history (2001-2009) and the 
second half of SCO history (2010-2017). 
 
The Chinese case: dependent variable 
When it comes to the “significant nonverbal behavior” indicator, the Chinese case shows a 
rather continuous allocation of resources towards SCO cooperation throughout the entire SCO 
history. This is most visible in the area of SCO financing. During the first half of SCO history 
examples of such committed behavior by allocating (financial) resources include an offer of a 
$900 million credit to each SCO member state in 2004 (Chung, 2006, p. 11), as well as 
“another $10 billion” (Zhao, 2013, p. 448) in 2009. China also created a special development 
fund, for the training of 1500 people from other SCO member states in the fields of economic, 
scientific-technical and humanitarian cooperation (Chung, 2006, p. 12). China allocated 
resources to military cooperation as well, as for example, when China took part in its first 
joint international military exercise in decades, with Kyrgyzstan in 2002 (Frost, 2009, p. 98; 
Yuan, 2010, p. 864). In subsequent joint SCO military missions, China repeatedly requested 
that these exercises should be expanded (Frost, 2009, p. 99). 
The important observation is that such resource allocating behavior did not end during 
the second half of SCO history. As is illustrated by China’s continued promotion of the 
implementation of the “Action Plan for the program of multilateral trade and economic 
cooperation among SCO member states”. Which was put into practice by China’s continued 
financial support for joint SCO projects (Tulibayeva & Sadvokassova, 2013, pp. 257-258). 
This resource allocating behavior by means of funding, is further evidenced by China’s 
proposal to use “funds of the investment organizations created by the People's Republic of 
China to fund economic projects in the SCO region” (SCO, 2014, p. 2).  
 Concerning the second indicator “pledging behavior”, China has issued various 
pledges to SCO cooperation over the course of SCO history. This started from the very 
beginning of the SCO, when in 2000 Chinese president Jiang Zemin called for the formation 
of the SCO from the Shanghai Five partners (Song, 2014, p. 91). By formally 
institutionalizing the SCO, the (informal) agreements between its member states became 
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formal pledges. China’s push for formal SCO institutionalization can therefore be seen as 
pledging behavior. Furthermore, China pledged itself to SCO cooperation by backing SCO 
agreements with other organizations, even though China itself is not a partner in some of 
these organizations. It is known that Russia, especially in the first decade of the SCO, favored 
its “own” China-exempt organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and the CSTO over the SCO, as part of its “multilateral security strategy” (Wilhelmsen & 
Flikke, 2011, p. 884; Yun & Park, 2012, p. 78). Because of this, Russia advocated cooperation 
between the SCO and other organizations (Oldberg, 2013, p. 141). In 2007, China showed a 
willingness to compromise on the issue, when the heads of the SCO member states “noted the 
need to deepen SCO’s cooperation with the CIS, Eurasia Economic Community and ASEAN” 
and “supported building ties between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization” (SCO, 2007, p. 3). In practice these pledges have led to “memoranda of 
understanding” with the CIS and the CSTO (SCO, n.d.). These consensus based decisions to 
cooperate with other organizations would have been impossible without Chinese support. 
Such compromises with Russia continue into the present, as is showcased by the expected 
2017 SCO membership expansion, described in the Russian section of the analysis. 
 During the second half of SCO history China continued to push for pledges and even 
pledges non-SCO projects to the SCO. As is illustrated by the willingness of China to 
integrate one of its largest and most prestigious projects into the SCO framework. In 2013 
Chinese president Xi Jinping announced a plan to create an overland transport network, 
connecting China via Central Asia to Europe. This project, dubbed the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, was merged in 2014 with a Maritime Silk Road project and became the OBOR initiative. 
The OBOR initiative has become a top priority for China (Fallon, 2015, p. 141). Furthermore, 
the project fits nicely within China’s “harmonious realism” policy. On the one hand, it 
defends Chinese core national interests, for example, by strengthening the economic ties with 
Europe and by developing the Xinjiang Autonomous Region which faces problems associated 
with Islamic minority separatism (Mackerras, 2015, pp. 40-39). On the other hand, it 
contributes to the “harmonious” part of “harmonious realism” by further “linking” China with 
its Central Asian neighbors (Fallon, 2015, p. 144). What shows China’s commitment to the 
SCO is the observation that China does not simply choose to pursue this project unilaterally 
and bilaterally, even though it is a prestigious one, touching on core national interests. Instead 
China seeks close cooperation with the SCO. The SCO heads of government therefore 
welcomed the Chinese initiative in 2014 and “consider important [sic] to arrange 
consultations and cooperation between the SCO member states on this issue” (SCO, 2014, p. 
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2). This is more than a one-time-only polite nod to China by the other SCO members, as 
nearly every subsequent SCO document continues to voice support for the project, including  
high profile ones, such as the Tashkent Declaration on the 15
th
 anniversary of the SCO (SCO,  
2016c, p. 14) and the SCO Development Strategy until 2025 (SCO, 2015a, p. 3). Also note 
that the SCO’s vocal support for this project illustrates Russia’s new-found commitment to 
the organization as well. Although Russia was initially “wary” of the project, seeing it is a 
Chinese threat to its Central Asian sphere of influence (Fallon, 2015, p. 145), it now actively 
participates in the project. This is illustrated by the fact that the Silk Road Economic Belt will 
now go through Russia, instead of going around its territory as was the original plan (Fallon, 
2015, p. 145). 
When it comes to the “implicit indicators of intentions” indicator of commitment 
strength, China has showcased such behavior throughout SCO history. Such implicit or even 
symbolical gestures include the establishment of the SCO secretariat in the Chinese capital of 
Beijing (SCO, 2002, p. 8) and the fact that the first secretary general of the SCO was a 
Chinese diplomat named Zhang Deguang (Plater-Zyberk & Monaghan, 2014, p. 55). During 
the second half of SCO history China’s intentions are illustrated by policy statements, such as 
when during its 2011-2012 chairmanship, according to China’s state-run newspaper the 
People’s Daily, China strived “to facilitate the implementation of agreements reached at the 
summit, and cooperation in economy and security” (as cited in Tulibayeva & Sadvokassova, 
2013, p. 257).  
  
 First half of SCO history 
2001-2009 
Second half of SCO history 
2010-2017 
Significant 
nonverbal behavior 
$900 mln credit. 
$10 bln credit. 
SCO Development Fund. 
Military exercises participation. 
Push for implementation of “Action 
Plan”. 
Funding of joint SCO projects. 
Pledging behavior Push for SCO institutionalization. 
Memoranda of understanding with 
CIS & CSTO. 
Compromise on SCO expansion. 
Pledging of OBOR to SCO. 
 
Implicit indicators of 
intentions 
SCO secretariat and first secretary 
general. 
Policy statements. 
No commitment No examples found. No examples found. 
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To summarize, these findings are listed in the table above. As is shown by the 
behavior fitting these indicators, China’s commitment to the SCO has been relatively strong 
throughout SCO history. This constant commitment strength matches the continuity in 
China’s balanced ego-alter-based role set of “harmonious realism” over the same timeframe.  
 
Conclusion 
Discussion 
This study aimed to answer the question: how do roles affect the strength of hegemonic 
commitment to an international governmental organization? By employing an FPA approach 
based on role theory, it was theorized that the basis for a state’s role set affects the strength of 
hegemonic commitment to an IGO. As to how this mechanism worked three hypotheses 
where drawn up.  
The first hypothesis stated that the more a hegemonic state switches from an alter- to 
an ego-based role set, the more the strength of commitment to an IGO decreases. The findings 
in the Russian case showed that this is not necessarily the case. While Russia in fact switched 
from an alter-based to an ego-based role set, its commitment to the SCO increased instead of 
decreased. 
 The second hypothesis stated that the more a hegemonic state switches from an ego- to 
an alter-based role set, the more the strength of commitment to an IGO increases. Based on 
the researched cases, the findings concerning this hypothesis remain inconclusive; as none of 
the researched cases showcased a shift from an alter- to an ego-based role set.  
 The third hypothesis; when a hegemonic state has a stable ego- or alter-based role set, 
the strength of commitment to an IGO remains stable, is confirmed for the Chinese case. The 
empirical evidence showed a stable balanced ego-alter role set over the same the timeframe as 
well as a relatively continuous high commitment strength. 
 These findings speak in favor of Harnisch’s model (2010) that a shift along the ego-
alter dimension leads to variance along the commitment spectrum. These findings indicate 
that this model also works for the commitment of hegemonic member states to IGOs. 
Therefore, in order to answer the question; as to how roles affect the strength of hegemonic 
commitment to an IGO, it can be argued that the basis of the hegemonic role sets, whether 
they are ego- or alter-based, affects the strength of commitment to an international 
governmental organization. 
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Implications 
Harnisch’s original model did not show a direction to the relationship between the ego-alter 
dimension and variance along the commitment spectrum. However, based on the cases he 
researched, the H1 and H2 hypotheses where drawn up in order to find such a direction. As 
the direction to the relationship, as demonstrated in the Russian case, works the other way as 
the direction shown in Harnisch’s cases, it can be concluded that this direction to the 
relationship is not always necessarily in the same direction as in the cases researched by 
Harnisch. Whether such a direction to the relationship even exists, or if it is just a case 
specific phenomenon requires further research. 
There is another important implication to be found in this study. While Harnisch wrote 
about shifts and variance, he did not discuss continuity and stability. The Chinese case 
demonstrates how a stable balanced ego-alter-based role set can lead to continuous 
commitment strength. This continuity by stability, although not researched or discussed by 
Harnisch, speaks in favor of his model. 
 
Evaluation 
Measuring commitment strength turned out to be a complicated ordeal. Using the indicators 
from the CREON project’s commitment scale made this task manageable. Some of these 
indicators, such as the “no commitment” indicator, where hard to identify for both cases as the 
SCO only publishes documents based on consensus. Therefore, identifying topics to which 
either state was not willing to commit itself, proved to be too difficult in some cases. 
Nevertheless, in order to get a general overview of whether commitment strength to the 
organization has increased, decreased or remained stable, the CREON project’s indicators 
proved to be useful. 
 Due to the fact that there are only two hegemons within the SCO, one of which 
experienced an alter- to an ego-based role set shift, while the other remained stable, means 
that one of the hypotheses could not be researched. In this case the H2 hypothesis concerning 
an ego- to an alter-based role set. Research into such a case is recommended for the future.  
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